




Monitor Synthesis: for software health management

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Where Are We?



Who Are We?

- Galois, Inc.
 - Galois' mission is to create **trustworthiness in critical systems**. We're in the business of **taking blue-sky ideas** and turning them **into real-world technology solutions**.
 - About 40 employees, including experts in **functional programming**, **formal methods**, and **security**.
- National Institute of Aerospace (NIA)
 - NIA is a non-profit research and graduate education institute created to conduct leading-edge **aerospace** and **atmospheric research** and **develop new technologies** for the nation.
 - Includes the **NIA Formal Methods Group**, working on critical systems of interest to NASA.

Project Staff

- Lee Pike, Galois (PI)
- César Muñoz, NIA (Co-PI)
- Alwyn Goodloe, NIA (Research Scientist)

- Consultants:
 - Joe Hurd, Galois
 - John Matthews, Galois

Software Health Management

- What is **software health** for embedded control systems?
 - Functional correctness
 - Timing properties
 - Safety properties (capturing fault-tolerance)Under the environmental assumptions.
- Problem:
 - **testing** cannot ensure the absence of errors in ultra-reliable systems,
 - and **formal proof** does not yet scale.
- So “who watches the watchmen?”

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Software Monitoring


- *Simplicity is the unavoidable price which we must pay for reliability.* —C.A.R. Hoare
- Simple **monitors** analyze executions at **runtime** for software health.
- Monitors **raise alarms** or attempt to **reset** the system (into a known safe state).
- **Research question:** can **software monitoring** form a basis of **software health management**?

Research Contributions to IVHM

- Our research hypothesis: we can **synthesize** software monitors for *ultra-reliable systems* that are **distributed**, **fault-tolerant**, **hard real-time**.
- Our research challenges:
 - Distributed systems may require **distributed monitoring** (diagnosis without global information).
 - Monitors should not jeopardize hard **real-time requirements** of the monitored systems.
 - Monitors *themselves* need to be **reliable**, perhaps requiring **fault-tolerance**.
 - **Formally** synthesizing these monitors from requirements.

Key Research Contributions

- **Approach:**
 - Formal synthesis of fault-tolerant monitors from system specifications.
- **Systems characterization:**
 - Hard real-time
 - Fault-tolerant
 - “Small graphs”
 - “Fixed topology”
- **Properties to monitor:**
 - Validity
 - Agreement
 - Timing constraints



Proposed Monitoring Case Studies

- NASA's *SPIDER* (Scalable Process-Independent Design for Enhanced Reliability)
 - An ultra-reliable databus designed and prototyped by the NASA Langley Safety-Critical Avionics Systems Branch.
 - Formally specified and verified fault-tolerant protocols.
- TTech's *TTEthernet*
 - Allows hard real-time communication and services over ethernet.
 - Formally specified properties.



Proposed Plan of Work

- Year 1
 - Survey state-of-the-art approaches to software health management.
 - Research monitors for **hard real-time** temporal constraints.
 - Research **synthesis framework**.
- Year 2
 - Develop **synthesis framework**.
 - Design monitors for timing properties, agreement, and validity for our case studies.
- Year 3
 - Develop monitors for our case studies.
 - Research the synthesis of **fault-tolerant monitors**.