Building a High-Assurance Unpiloted Air Vehicle

Lee Pike (speaker), Pat Hickey, James Bielman, Trevor Elliott, John Launchbury, Erlend Hamberg, Thomas DuBuisson

MEMOCODE | Oct 2013



The Problem



src: Kathleen Fisher, http://www.cyber.umd.edu/events/symposium

The Challenge

galois

High-Assurance Cyber-Military Systems (HACMS) PM: Dr. Kathleen Fisher



http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/I2O/Programs/High-Assurance_Cyber_Military_Systems_(HACMS).aspx

The "Air Team"



- Rockwell Collins/Univ. Minn.: integration and architecture
- DRAPER/AIS/U. Oxford (Red Team): vulnerability analysis

- Boeing: military vehicle
- Galois, Inc.: autopilot synthesis
- NICTA: networking/operating systems



SMACCMPilot

- Secure
- Mathematically
- Assured
- Composition of
- Control
- Models



This Talk

How we built have nearly built

- Ivory: a memory-safe language/compiler
- **Tower**: an architectural coordination language
- **SMACCMPilot**: a high(er)-assurance autopilot

in 2-3 engineer-years (~1 calendar year).

How We Did It

1.Collaborate with a vibrant open-source system/community

- 2.Build **embedded domain-specific languages (EDSLs)** and type-safe macros
- 3.Synthesize the architecture

In the Beginning...

There was Arduino

- Simple 8-bit AVR
- For DIY beginners in embedded systems
- ArduPilot Mega Hardware AVR Processor: 8 bit, 16MHz, 8k RAM, 256k Flash





ArduPilot

- ArduPilot
 - Arduino-based
 - Open-source hardware and software
 - 25 volunteer developers worldwide
 - 1000s of users
 - Starting to see commercial use



- DIYDrones.com
 - 30,000 users, 99% amateurs and hobbyists
 - Home of the ArduPilot project
 - Emphasis on beginner friendly



ArduPilot Robustness

- Monolithic design
- Platform-specific C/C++
- Hobbyist use-cases
 - No communication security, fault-tolerance
 - But being adopted in security-critical environments
- No regimented testing/verification story

The Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)



Gave back to the open-source community. The foundation for ArduPilot now.

Designing a Language for Safety and Security

Design goal: give the programmer a few centimeters less rope than required to hang herself

- Help ensure
 - Memory safety
 - Timing safety (i.e., easier WCET analysis)
 - Functional correctness

- While being flexible:
 - bit-data manipulation
 - memory-area manipulation
 - "escaping" to/interrop with C
 - readable generated code

Just...No.

Stateflow model of Tetris game (included in the Stateflow Demo models from the Mathworks!).

Diagram is essentially a control-flow graph of a program that implements tetris.

Much harder to read and modify than an equivalent program.



galois

Model © The Mathworks, 2007

© 2013 Galois, Inc. All rights reserved.

Haskell

- Strong, static, polymorphic type checking and inference
- Pure, higher-order language—no side effects
- Functional programing for modularity: program composition is function composition

Why Functional Programming Matters by John Hughes (1990)

What if...

Can we have the high-level abstractions and type-safety of functional programming in embedded systems programming?

Approaches:

- Design a new FP-inspired language/compiler from scratch?
 No:
 - Would take too long
 - No library support
- Take the Haskell compiler and pair it down? **No**:
 - The runtime system is 50KLOCs of C/C--
 - And there's little control over memory usage (it's lazy) and it's a hog--"hello world" takes over 1MB

EDSL



Ivory language: 2.5KLOCs Ivory compiler: 1.2KLOCs

- Building a programming language is hard!
- Get your programming language features for free:
 - Syntax & Parser
 - Type Checker
 - Macro language is type-safe and Turingcomplete

"Just" a powerful Haskell library

Compiling and Running Ivory

galois



Who's Used EDSLs?

galois

- Eaton: garbage truck controllers
- Boeing: component configuration
- Ericsson: DSP

. . .

- Xilinx: FPGA synthesis
- Soostone: high-speed trading

© 2013 Galois, Inc. All rights reserved.

Ivory Example

Loop over an array adding x to each element:



Haskell as Type-Safe Macro Language

```
arrayExample :: Def('[ Ref s (Array 4 (Stored Uint8))
    , Uint8] :-> ()
)
arrayExample = proc "arrayExample"
    $ \arr x -> body
    $ arrayMap (arrAdd arr x)
    $ \ix -> do
        v <- deref (arr ! ix)
        store (arr ! ix) (v + x)
    $ tore (arr ! ix) (v + x)
```

```
arrAdd :: (Num a, SingI len, IvoryStore a)
=> Ref s (Array len (Stored a)) And arbitrary data-types
-> a
-> Ix len Can be used for arbitrary-length arrays
arrAdd arr x ix = do
v <- deref (arr ! ix)
store (arr ! ix) (v + x)</pre>
```

Macros, Example 2

```
data Cond eff = Cond IBool (Ivory eff ())
(==>) = Cond
cond [] = return ()
cond (Cond b f : cs) = ifte_ b f (cond cs)
```

ifte (x >? 100) (store result 10) (ifte (x >? 50)	<pre>cond [x >? 100 ==> store result 10 , x >? 50 ==> store result 5 , x >? 0 ==> store result 1</pre>
<pre>(ifte (x >? 0) (store result 1) (store result 0)))</pre>	, true ==> store result 0
<pre>(store result 0)))</pre>	I

Ivory Memory-Safety

- No null pointer dereferences
- No out-of-bounds array-indexing
- No unsafe implicit casting
- No unexpected type coercions—even satisfying the C standard!

```
Distilled ArduPilot bug discovered by Galois:
...
uint8_t a = 10;
uint8_t b = 250;
printf("Answer: %i, %i", a-b > 0, (uint8_t)(a-b) > 0);
...
```

Answer: 0, 1
Assuming int > uint8_t

Ivory: What We Removed

- No heap allocation (only stack)
- Unbounded looping combinators

Except for a single forever combinator

- void type
- Machine-dependent sizes (modulo float, double)
- Side-effecting expressions
- Pointer arithmetic

Ivory: What We Added

- Effect types
 - Allocation effects: "This function can't (stack) allocate memory"
 - Escape effects: "No break is allowed in this loop"
 - Return effects: "This macro cannot contain a return statement"
- References (guaranteed non-null pointers)
- Array map/fold combinators
- Automatic assertions
 - arithmetic underflow/overflow
 - div-by-zero
 - user-specified assertions

Ivory: TBD

- Sum types (unions)
- Fat pointers/strings
- Function pointers
- A better module system
- Interpreters for embedded software

galois

Tower

© 2013 Galois, Inc. All rights reserved.

- Goal: address the "glue code" problem: task initialization and communication.
 - Specifies how a tasks are scheduled and communicate Pub/sub model
 - Provides both time-triggered and event-triggered behaviors
 - Channels (queues) and data-ports (shared data) communication
 - Able to specify both interrupt handlers and user tasks
- Tower is "just" Ivory macros so has all the type-safety guarantees of Ivory—and no new code generator!



galois

Signal Task



SMACCMPilot

© 2013 Galois, Inc. All rights reserved.

The Hardware

- ArduPilot Mega Hardware (Legacy)
 AVR Processor: 8 bit, 16MHz,
 8k RAM, 256k Flash

• PX4 Hardware (SMACCMPilot)
 ARM Cortex M4 Processor: 32 bit,
 168Mhz, 192k RAM, 1024k Flash



https://pixhawk.ethz.ch/px4/en/start

SMACCMPilot Architecture



Approx. 5x code generation



galois

© 2013 Galois, Inc. All rights reserved.

smaccmpilot.org



Hardware Guide

Complete instructions for building a SMACCMPilot based quadcopter.



And the technology used to build it:

Ivory Language

SMACCMPilot is the flagship project of a new programming language called lvory, a domain specific language for safe systems programming.

Learn about Ivory »

Software Guide

Learn about how the SMACCMPilot software platform works, and how to develop for it.

Get hacking »

Ivory Tutorial

Walk through an lvory program with annotations introducing some of the features of the language.



Open Source

The SMACCMPilot platform is an open-source project, released under a liberal BSD license.

Find it on Github »

Tower Framework

Tower is a framework for composing lvory programs into multithreaded applications.

Tower Overview »

Lessons Learned/Open Problems

- Memory safety isn't a pancea
 - We still test/debug/verify
 - Traceability from DSLs to object code is necessary
 - But the kinds of bugs is restricted: seg-faults, memory leaks don't happen
- EDSL shortcomings:
 - Reusing a general-purpose type-checker
 - Requires host-language knowledge
 - Abstractions/macros can affect performance
 - Compilation cycle
- Interpreters for embedded systems are hard
- Have not proved architectural properties or verified controllers

Questions



galois