Open Problems in the formal verification of SPIDER

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Outline

- NASA LaRC Formal Methods Group
- SPIDER Project
- Preliminary Dissertation Ideas



NASA LaRC Formal Methods Group





NASA LaRC Formal Methods Group

- 9 Civil Servants
- 3 National Institute of Aerospace Researchers



NASA LaRC FM Group: Current Research

- Formal methods for embedded systems
- Theorem-prover Databases
- Model checking
- PVS extensions/improvements
- Accident investigation
- Formal analysis of air traffic management
- Standards development for software/hardware development
- Other applications of formal methods



NASA LaRC FM Group: Goals

- Technology Transfer
 - Industry
 - Academic Institutions
 - Government
- Basic Research
- Developing Industry/Government Standards
- Education
- Promoting Formal Methods



The SPIDER Project



"Time turns the improbable into the inevitable"

—Unkown

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- Synchronized Processor-Independent Design for Electromagnetic Resilience (SPIDER)
- A synchronized, reconfigurable, fault-tolerant communications bus, the Reliable Optical BUS (ROBUS)





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SPIDER: Who?

- Formal methods:
 - Paul Miner (lead)
 - Jeffrey Maddalon
 - Alfons Geser (NIA)
 - Radu Siminiceanu (NIA)
 - Lee Pike
- Engineering:
 - Mahyar Malekpour
 - Wilfredo Torres-Pomales
- Industry Partners:
 - Derivation Systems, Inc.



SPIDER: Who?

- We are a small group:
 - Approx. 2 FTE formal methods
 - Approx. 1.5 FTE engineering
- (TTTech has over 110 FTE employees)



What Distinguishes SPIDER?

- Formal methods integrated into system design.
- A generous maximum fault assumption.
- Sophisticated fault-tolerant protocols.
 - Interactive Consistency
 - Distributed Diagnosis
 - Clock Synchronization
 - Reintegration
 - Start-up/Restart
 - Schedule update



SPIDER: Project Goals

- Develop an ultra-reliable communications bus for use in safety-critical applications such as
 - Federated commercial avionics
 - Space-exploration vehicles
 - Unmanned aerial vehicle communications (UAVs)
- Provide a case-study for FMs in systems development.
 - For FAA guidelines in hardware design assurance.
 - For demonstrating the feasibility & utility for other x-by-wire safety-critical systems.
- Basic research in formal methods, fault-tolerance, distributed systems, and intrusion-tolerance.



SPIDER: Project Goals

- Design a fault-tolerant system for extreme environments:
 - Probability of bus failure $\leq 10^{-10}$ for a 10 hour mission.
 - High malicious fault-arrival rates acceptable.
 - Long mission times/repair intervals feasible.
- Make formal methods understandable to non-experts.
 - Engineers, architects, etc.
 - Certification authorities



SPIDER: Open Problems in FM

Many formal methods, no formal integration

- Theorem proving (PVS)
- Model checking (SMART, etc.)
- Hardware Synthesis (DRS, VHDL)

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SPIDER: Open Problems in FM

- Different specifications of the protocols.
 - PVS: Specs compose processes and the environment.
 - SMART/DRS/VHDL: Specs are of individual processes (and all but SMART do not model the environment).
- What good are our formal specs if our engineers and certification authorities cannot decipher them?



Specification Differences

- A process-level behavioral specification:
 - Is how we think about distributed algorithms & protocols (?).
 - Can be decomposed from the environment.
 - Is the initial specification from which an implementation of a single process can be derived.
- A system-level behavioral specification:
 - Allows for simple & transparent proof methods, especially in a theorem-prover.
 - Is the natural model for reasoning about global environmental assumptions.